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ABSTRACT - This paper aims at proving empirically the superiority of an explanation for recent 
financial crises in emerging countries which combines endogenous and exogenous factors rather 
than focusing only on one of these two kinds of factors. To this end, empirical analysis on estimates 
of random effects models for statistics of Fisher is built. Elements of a similar explanation have been 
made in the context of a particular crisis. This contribution covers the crises (Mexican 1994, Asian 
1997 and Russian 1998), thus covering most of the financial crises that took place during the last 
decade of the twentieth century.  
 
Since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the frequency of financial crises has increased 
significantly. Over the last decade, these financial turbulences have affected the countries of 
Southeast Asia and Latin America with particular brutality. Moreover, the financial crises of the 
nineties seem to differ from those that preceded them in that the fragility of the banking sector 
appears as one of the first symptoms and no longer - as was the case previously - as the ultimate 
result of other disorders (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1996). This banking fragility of emerging 
countries may have eventually increased the degree of risk aversion of international investors. It was 
also more likely to lead to a different perception or reassessment by these investors of the risks 
incurred
1
. In both cases, this has resulted in increased volatility in international capital flows and 
increased contagiousness of financial crises.  
The diversity of triggers of recent crises has revived an old debate: are the crises of the nineties 
mainly determined by endogenous or exogenous causes to the affected economies? The first 
diagnosis emphasizes the pre-existing fragility of economies (the fundamentals), while the second 
emphasizes the role played by complex and varied mechanisms of contagion or propagation.  
To answer this question, three econometric specifications summarizing the different possible 
explanations for the origin of the crises are estimated and compared. Each of these specifications 
considers an endogenous variable, an index summarizing the degree and intensity of the crisis. To 
ensure the robustness of our conclusions, several synthetic indices of crises are used. Nevertheless, a 
binary dependent variable in the estimates in the manner of Frankel and Rose (1996) were not used, 
because the goal is not to predict the crisis, but rather to explain it from the direct effect of the 
explanatory variables.  
Based on statistical tests of classical nested models and comparisons of model simulations with real 
values, the specification that best summarizes the observed reality are identified. Whatever the index 
used to define the crisis, the model with intermingling of endogenous and exogenous factors is 
maintained.  
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The stakes in this question are obvious. Depending on the answer, crises can be more or less 
predictable. They can indeed be more easily predicted if they are mainly of endogenous origin than 
if they are linked to exogenous factors. Depending on the diagnosis made, the range of countries 
likely to be contaminated is more or less extensive and also predictable. Finally, the type of response 
given to this question determines the therapeutics to be put in place to prevent or contain seizures. If 
financial crises are considered to be mainly related to exogenous causes, global solutions should be 
favored or, at the very least, strengthened international co-ordination, particularly to reduce 
excessive exchange rate fluctuations and interest rates. Countries with a high risk of contagion may 
try to avoid this risk through capital controls.  
Conversely, if crises are produced by endogenous causes, then the burden of prevention and crisis 
resolution lies with the responsibility of the latter: the emerging countries themselves, to whom task 
of driving the necessary "reorganization", the "interior cleaning", the "good housekeeping " of their 
economy (strengthening prudential control, better macroeconomic management, etc.), in order to 
eliminate these causes of vulnerability.  
A possible first diagnosis of the origin of recent financial crises interprets these as the result of the 
intrinsic fragility of the countries concerned or, in other words, the weakness of their fundamental: 
excessive government deficit and indebtedness, deficiencies of the banking system, overvaluation of 
the national currency, depletion of foreign exchange reserves, incompatibility between the 
macroeconomic policies pursued and the maintenance of a rigid anchoring regime for the national 
currency.  
The poor internal allocation of external flows has also often been invoked to denounce the practice 
of collecting short-term foreign borrowed resources repayable in foreign currencies and using them 
to finance long-term loans (real estate loans) in foreign currency. It is easy to understand that this 
double misalignment (currency mismatch and maturity mismatch) carries with it the risk of financial 
difficulties.  
In the case of the Asian crisis, the vulnerability of the banking system actually seems to have been 
"the weak link"
 
of affected economies, which empirically confirms Tatsuyoshi (2000). This 
alternative perspective of the previous one attributes the main responsibility for recent financial 
disorders to the extreme volatility of international capital movements and, behind them, to the 
behavior of international investors.  
A common feature of the financial crises of emerging countries in the 1990s is indeed a significant 
increase in short-term capital inflows during the period preceding the crisis, followed by a sudden 
reversal of these flows, which has almost always triggered the crisis. For example, private capital 
flows to emerging countries that had reached 140 billion dollars in 1996 fell to 40 billion in 1997 
and are totally dried up the following year bank lending to Asian countries hardest hit by the crisis 
(Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand) contracted sharply from $49 billion in 
the first half of 1997 to -39 billion
 
1997 and -96 billion in
. 
bank loans to these countries, which had 
increased in 1995 by the equivalent of 5.5% of their GDP, decreased in 1997 by the equivalent of 
10% of GDP.  
The scenario considered here (crisis linked to exogenous causes) implies that the situation of a 
country contaminated by the crisis is not the determining cause. The transmission of the crisis from 
one country to another would tend to be effected by "pure contagion" in the sense given to this term 
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by Masson (1998), that is to say according to complex mechanisms
 
which depend on the basic 
characteristics of the economies affected.  
Another exogenous mechanism explicitly takes into account in this empirical study is the third-party 
market. The latter also seems to have played an important role during the recent crises in the 
countries of South-East Asia and Latin America (Kirrane 2017). The logic of pure contagion was 
theorized by Masson (1998). According to this author, it is a key element in understanding the speed 
and unpredictability of the crisis propagation process of the nineties.  
Masson has shown that a crisis in one country can coordinate and polarize investors' expectations by 
changing them from one good to the other in a different economy. The mimetic behavior of agents 
(which is not necessarily irrational), the "flight to quality" (the search for the safest investments 
when the crisis breaks out in a given country), moral hazard phenomena
 
can explain this particular 
contagiousness of recent crises.  
However, Goldstein and Pauzner (2001) have identified a limitation of this work. Indeed, Masson 
could not explain by what precise mechanisms the phenomenon of pure contagion takes place. As a 
result, it is impossible to evaluate the probability of each equilibrium and, consequently, it is not 
possible to explicitly grasp the "mechanics" of the contagion. To overcome this problem, Goldstein 
and Pauzner (2001) addressed the case of investors diversifying their portfolios across two countries. 
The occurrence of a crisis in a country reduces the well-being of these investors and encourages 
them to rebalance their portfolios in order to manage risk or liquidity (flight to quality). Thus, the 
probability of a self-fulfilling crisis
 
increases in the second country. Some countries are therefore at 
risk of hemorrhaging capital unrelated to their basic economic data.  
By analogy to this reasoning, a common creditor
 
can also induce a pure contagion effect. Indeed, a 
currency crisis in a country reduces the ability of domestic borrowers to repay loans that have been 
granted by foreign banks. In response to a large share of nonperforming receivables, foreign banks 
rebuild their capital by revoking loans in other countries (Pesenti and Tille, 2000). Similarly, Kumar 
and Persaud (2001) consider that the increase in risk can lead to pure contagion and that the 
mechanism of the transmission of this contagion will be through the portfolios of international 
investors including the financial link of the joint creditor. This mechanism seems to have had some 
influence in the Asian and Russian crises.  
Another source of exogeneity also developed by Masson (1998) under the name of monsoon effect, 
explains that an apparently innocuous change in the United States united countries, in Europe or in 
Japan (example: a rise in the interest rate) can provoke a major destabilization of the emerging 
countries, especially those whose economy is the most open on the outside and most strongly 
integrated with the international markets of capital external shocks are transmitted to these countries 
in an amplified way.  
This mechanism seems to have played both in 1994 during the Mexican crisis and in 1997 at the 
time of the Asian crisis. In addition, the rise of the US dollar against the yen since 1994 may have 
also contributed to the deterioration of the current account balance of these countries (although the 
appreciation of the dollar is not enough to explain the slowdown in exports). The deep decline in 
global semiconductor prices in 1996 also contributed to this.  
Mechanism
 
highlights the role of trade interdependencies between the crisis country and the 
contaminated country. Indeed, devaluation following a currency crisis in a country reduces exports 
and increases imports of trading partners. This chain of commercial and currency contamination is a 
175 
 
well-known traditional mechanism for transmitting the economic difficulties at work in most old and 
new crises. However, in the same way as that of the common creditor, this mechanism is part of an 
exogenous determination of the crisis. Indeed, in the countries contaminated by this commercial 
channel, it is not the vulnerability of the economy that provokes the crisis, but it is the transmission 
of the crisis that degrades the fundamentals of the contaminated countries.  
Obviously, the financial crises of emerging countries are neither exclusively endogenous nor 
exclusively exogenous. These two categories of crisis factors combine intimately, which - except in 
special cases - reduced interest in terms interpretations of "responsibility" exclusively national or 
international.  
This idea is not new. In 1996, Sachs and Tornell Velasco (1996) had already defended about the 
1994 Mexican crisis showing empirically a certain degree of vulnerability was a prerequisite for 
understanding the Tequila effect, including an overvalued real exchange rate and excessive growth 
of bank credit (lending boom),the one and the other associated with a low level of reserves.  
Apart from the possibility of fundamentals, either very favorable or frankly unfavorable, there would 
be a critical intermediate zone characterized by multiple equilibria within which a speculative attack 
can occur, which can be described as a self-fulfilling the extent to which it results not from a 
modification of the fundamentals, but from a change in the behavior of the operators. The 
speculative attack, even if it is difficult to predict, is however not totally random since it results from 
an earlier fragility of the economy, that is to say from its entry into the risk zone, induced by an 
earlier degradation of its fundamentals. More generally, the idea of nesting endogenous and 
exogenous factors can be supported by two complementary arguments.  
The explanation of crises by exclusively endogenous factors emphasizes that their eruption or 
propagation always relies on certain intrinsic weaknesses of the affected economies. However, this 
explanation has little meaning or interest when it is made a posteriori. Any economy whatsoever, be 
it the most powerful in the world, always has some weaknesses if we study it carefully. When the 
crisis intervenes without it being planned, including by the rating agencies, its "fundamentalist" 
reinterpretation ex post is akin to reconstruction, justifying anything after the fact.  
The above argument also allows us to assert - conversely - that a crisis is deemed to be caused by 
exogenous factors of origin not because it would be independent of the fundamentals of the country, 
but because the underlying vulnerabilities of this one were not perceived (or perceived as such) by 
the agents. The crisis then acts as a "wake-up call".  For this reason, it seems useless to try to explain 
recent crises solely by exogenous factors or by exclusively endogenous factors. These two 
interpretations finally present the same "fragility".  
However, these endogenous causes did not act alone. They have been accompanied by other 
exogenous causes of contagion. In this article, we have considered two of them: the common 
creditor mechanism and the third party market. Thus, during these three episodes, the contagion 
would not have been very important if the contaminated savings were not vulnerable. In fact, Sachs 
et al. (1996) found these conclusions for the case of the Mexican crisis in isolation. Tornell (1999) 
found them in the case of the two Mexican and Asian crises. In our work, we have identified the 
occurrence of this phenomenon for the three Mexican, Asian and Russian crises. However, in order 
to ensure the correct economic specification of the model and the consistency of our estimation 
results, we analyzed the correspondence between the expected and observed values of the crisis 
index.  
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To conclude, it can be said that each of the two types of endogenous and exogenous causes has been 
decisive in the recent financial crises. However, the improvement in the quality of fit and the Fisher 
tests show that these factors have worked together, intimately combining. In other words, and 
without discussing the mechanisms of this imbrication, it can be concluded that during the crises we 
studied, the spread to the contaminated countries was caused by a vulnerability of these economies 
(insufficient reserves exchange rate in the face of the loss of confidence of investors 
international banking fragility, overvalued currency which aggravated the situation lack of 
competitiveness in the third market). This result confirms the idea that was already argued 
previously (Sandretto 2000).  
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